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1 Introduction
In the decades before World War I, industrialization and nationalism were two of the most apparent
developments in Germany. Nationalism became more and more popular and radical, while at the
same time Germany experienced its late and rapid industrialization. This decade was one of the
most dynamic phases for the German economy, which abruptly ended with World War I. For these
reasons, this historical period is an important and interesting setting to research the sources of
radicalization in a society. With a detailed examination of Prussia before World War I, I am able
to examine the role of industrialization for the mass radicalization and militarization. Thereby, I
can provide further understanding how the economic developments in the beginning of the 20th can
be linked to the mass militarization and nationalism that ultimately led to World War I. Doing
so, I can take up the conclusion on the first globalization from O’Rourke & Williamson (1999,
p. 287) who state that “far from being destroyed by unforeseen and exogenous political events,
globalization, at least in part, destroyed itself”. In their analysis, O’Rourke & Williamson (1999)
highlight the protectionist polices as a reaction of those who lost due to increasing international
trade, as also highlighted by Lehmann (2010), and restrictions for migration. Similarly, I expect
that regions that fall behind during the industrialization tend to become more nationalistic. This
paper aims to analyze drivers of further nationalist elements besides trade and migration policies.
I focus on nationalism and industrialization in the everyday life in Germany by asking the follow-
ing question: To what extent was the rise in nationalism a response to industrialization within
Prussia? For answering this question, I rely on data on the “Kriegervereine”, the biggest civil
organization which comprised more than three million members in Imperial Germany in 1913, as
a proxy for nationalism. In comparison, all trade unions combined had 2.6 million members before
WWI (Schneider 1989). After WWI, the “Kriegervereine” remained influential and, among other
organizations, became a a good predictor for membership in the NSDAP (Satyanath et al. 2017).
My dataset is based on the reports published by the “Kriegervereine”. It includes the number of
members at district level between 1903 and 1913. In this period, the growth rate of the organization
was 40 % and led to 500.000 new members in Prussia. Thus, nationalism became more and
more a mass phenomenon during the decade before World War I. To pinpoint the influence of
industrialization, I use data on employment in industry sectors for every district. There might be,
however, issues of omitted variables and reverse causation or both. To address these concerns, I
calculate coal potential as an instrumental variable for every district. This instrumental variable
is based on information on the area from the late carboniferous age and contemporary knowledge
on the availability of coal resources from 1913 following Fernihough & O’Rourke (2014).
My results show strong evidence for a causal relationship between industrialization and the
spread of nationalism in the beginning of the 20th century. An increase in industry employment by
one standard deviation corresponds to decrease in the share of membership in the “Kriegervereine”
by 0.5 standard deviation. Concerning mechanisms for this effect, the results show mixed evidence
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for a Heckscher-Ohlin based explanation as highlighted by Lehmann (2010). Instead, using a
three stage IV framework, I find evidence that the results are driven by migration patterns within
Germany. Regions with a substantial out-migration driven by the industrialization process tend
to become more nationalist. This is in line with contemporary thinking, e.g. Max Weber called
for a nationalist reaction due to these migration patterns. Moreover, building on a theoretical
paper from Shayo (2009) on the formation of social identities, I can show that membership in
trade unions has a strong negative effect on membership in the “Kriegervereine”.
With this paper, I can contribute to four strands of literature. One branch studies different
determinants of political extremism, e.g. import competition (Autor et al. 2016, Colantone &
Stanig 2017, Dippel et al. 2017), economic crises (de Bromhead et al. 2013, Funke et al. 2016), and
migration (Becker & Fetzer 2016). With this analysis, I am able to add structural change linked
to industrialization as an important determinant that has been largely neglected in the literature.
Second, I am able to add another indicator for nationalism. Instead of relying on voting patterns
as done in many studies, e.g. Autor et al. (2016), Becker & Fetzer (2016), Funke et al. (2016), I use
the “Kriegervereine” as an indicator for nationalism and political extremism grounded in everyday
life. This gives a more solid indicator for a nationalist orientation than voting behaviors that
might be driven by protest voting. In addition, in the field of economic history the most common
indicator for nationalism is protectionism (Lehmann 2010). However, nationalism also implies
militaristic and discriminatory behavior beyond trade. These elements are captured by analyzing
the “Kriegervereine”. Third, I am able to contribute to economic studies on nationalism, e.g.
the theoretical paper by Alesina & Reich (2015) on nation building and the empirical analysis by
Cinnirella & Schueler (2017) on the role of spending in education on the spread of nationalism.
In contrast to these studies that understand nationalism as a top-down process with the implicit
assumption of manipulation, I take a bottom-up perspective and, thereby, follow the work from
historians (Eley 1991, Vogel 1997) and a recent study in economics by Suesse & Wolf (2017).
Fourth, I can contribute to the new literature on the dark side of social capital (Koenig 2015,
Satyanath et al. 2017). So far, these studies showed the effects of the dark side of social capital
on the rise of right wing parties. Instead, I will ask for the economic reasons why the dark side of
social capital becomes more attractive.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: In the next section, I will describe the
historical background of the “Kriegervereine”. In section III, I will describe the dataset. Section




Nationalism in Imperial Germany became increasingly popular and radical after 1890 (Conrad
2010). Civil organizations were the most important medium for this spread of nationalism (Walken-
horst 2007, p.14). The prominent ones were the “Alldeutscher Verband” (Pan-German League),
the “Ostmarkenverein” (German Eastern Marches Society), the “Flottenverein” (Navy League),
the “Wehrverein” (Army League) and the “Kriegervereine” (Veterans Organizations). Except for
the latter, these organizations were mainly based on nationalism from above. The underlying as-
sumption for this kind of nationalism is that broad masses can be manipulated. In this way the
elites aimed to divert attention from internal political tensions, e.g. the classic interpretation of
the historians Kehr (1930) and Wehler (2006).1 Unlike the “Alldeutscher Verband” and similar
organizations and in spite of their enormous size, the “Kriegervereine” were often forgotten in the
historical literature.2
The “Kriegervereine” are a striking example for nationalism from below, as their foundations
are rooted in the everyday life of the German population. Their members were men who chose to
join the “Kriegervereine” after their compulsory military service.3 The first “Kriegervereine” were
founded in 1786 after Frederick the Great died (Elliot 1975), but they started to become popular
just after the German unification in 1871 (Rohkrämer 1990) and became important multipliers of
nationalism (Walkenhorst 2007, p.44). Most members belonged to the lower middle classes, while
the upper middle classes mainly filled the leading positions (Rohkrämer 1990). More precisely,
peasants, commercial workers, and artisans represented each roughly 25%, whereas civil servants
and clerks made up a total of almost 20%. Overall the upper classes were underrepresented
(Rohkrämer 1990). In 1899, the umbrella organization “Kyffhäuser Bund” was founded with
official support of the monarch.4 They became the biggest organization in Imperial Germany with
almost three million members in 1913. Thereby, the “Kriegervereine” surpassed even the size of
the trade unions.
Following the concept of social capital by Bourdieu (2011) and the empirical analysis by
Satyanath et al. (2017) who use networks of associations as indicator for social capital, member-
ship in the “Kriegervereine” could be seen as “dark side” of social capital. In every administrative
1This interpretation is part of the debate in historiography on the German Sonderweg according
to which the old agrarian elites were not willing to modernize. These old feudal elements as
manifestation of the irregular modernization in the German society are - according to Wehler and
others - the breeding ground for the Nazis.
2Exceptions are the dissertation by Rohkrämer (1990) and some articles (Düding 1986, Elliot
1975, Saul 1969).
3Only men were members. This is typical for the traditional gender roles that went hand in
hand with nationalism in the 19th century (Frevert 1996).
4Initial reason for the umbrella organization “Kyffhäuser Bund” was to build a monument for
Emperor Wilhelm I in the Kyffhäuser Mountains (Düding 1986) based on an old myth according
to which emperor Barbarossa and his followers would sleep and would awake at some time to build
a new empire. This myth was often linked to the German unification of 1871. Thus, the name of
the umbrella organization might be termed as an “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm 1993).
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district, several local groups were active and played an active and important role in daily life by
participating in parades. Hence, good relations to the “Kriegervereine” and especially the member-
ship in them were social capital on a local level legitimized by the official support of the monarch.
Rohkrämer (1990, p.77) highlights that members in the “Kriegervereine” had advantages in the
search for employment and flats. An illustrative example for the political profits of social capital is
the protagonist Diederich Heßling in the novel “Der Untertan” (Man of Straw) by Heinrich Mann
from 1918, who tries to get more votes for the nationalistic candidate in the election with the help
of the “Kriegervereine” (Mann 1969, p.118).
In the Weimar republic, the “Kriegervereine” remained influential and were in favor of a “War
of Rectification” (Elliot 1975).5 Satyanath et al. (2017) show that in cities with more people
engaged in civil organizations including the “Kriegervereine” people over-proportionally joined the
NSDAP. In addition, there were more votes for right wing parties in those regions with more war
veterans from WWI (Koenig 2015). Both studies show the political effects of the “Kriegervereine”
in the Weimar republic. However, little is known about the reasons why the “Kriegervereine”
became popular. Before analyzing the reasons, let me present three main reasons whereupon the
“Kriegervereine” were instrumental for the spread of everyday nationalism.
First, they strongly supported the military and its immense importance in line with wide spread
political claims of that time. In their beliefs, war was deemed natural and the military operated
as the “school of the nation” (Düding 1986). Therefore, the local “Kriegervereine” regularly met
for shooting exercises on Sundays to strengthen their militaristic expertise. In addition, a younger
generation wanted to step out of the shadows of the veterans (Rohkrämer 1990). Thus, this
generation conflict further increased the militaristic orientation.
Second, the “Kriegervereine” had a strong link to the nation state manifesting itself in an
oath on the emperor they had to give during their military service which applied for the rest
of their life (Düding 1986). Furthermore, the “Kriegervereine” got the privilege to participate
in the front rows of public events (Vogel 2000), e.g. to celebrate the German unification from
1871 on January 18 each year. Throughout the time between 1871 and 1914 they ensured that
the unification of 1871 was of tremendous importance to the German population (Kocka 2001,
p.81) and thereby supported the spread and salience of nationalism in Germany. This support for
the nation is one reason why Emperor Wilhelm I called them “die zweite Armee im Bürgerrock”
(second army in middle class clothes) (Kyffhäuser-Bund der Deutschen Landes-Kriegerverbände
1907, p.67). Despite this strong link to the nation state, the politicization, e.g. concerning the
politics on a national level in form of opposition against the social democrats, was less successful
than expected and intended (Saul 1969). On the contrary, the nationalist support of the nation
on a local level seemed to be of major importance. Vogel describes this as a folkloristic militarism
with a “chiefly apolitical popular enthusiasm for the military” (Vogel 2000, p.488). Nevertheless,
5Their position towards the Nazis was at least ambivalent, see for further details Elliot (1975).
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the “Kriegervereine” supported the nationalistic candidates during election campaigns (Düding
1986).
Third, the “Kriegervereine” made use of the typical nationalist elements to foster their everyday
popularity. They organized many parades, were obsessed with flags and building monuments,
e.g. the famous Kyffhäuser monument. Parades and monuments are part of what Hobsbawm
(1993) describes as “invented traditions”. Furthermore, the “Kriegervereine” provided support
for the funerals of their members. In addition, they used mass media effectively on a local level
that fits to the nationalism in that time (Anderson 1991, p.161). For instance, the “Kyffhäuser-
Korrespondenz”, which provided articles printed in small local newspapers, were read by millions
of people (Saul 1969).
Therefore, it clearly appears that the “Kriegervereine” are a good indicator for a form of
nationalism that is rooted in the everyday life of millions of people in the decade before WWI in
Germany
3 Data
In the following, I will describe the different data sources used as well as the steps that were
necessary to compile the dataset. An overview of variables and sources is given in the Appendix
in Table 6 and the summary statistics are presented in the Appendix in Table 8. My dataset
is restricted to Prussian counties. This sample offers three main advantages: First, it picks up
large variation in terms of economic development between the counties. Whereas especially the
eastern parts were mainly dominated by agriculture, some areas such as Silesia and the Ruhr
area established themselves as new industrial centers. Second, the data availability is better in
comparison to Imperial Germany. Third, the focus on Prussia limits the effect of institutional
variation as a confounding factor, as the institutional framework across all regions was nearly
identical.
The “Kriegervereine”
The annual reports of the “Kyffhäuser-Bund” were the main source of regional data on the
“Kriegervereine”.6 These reports are available for all years between 1900 and 1916. In compar-
ison to other indicators for nationalism, like voting results, information on membership numbers
of the “Kriegervereine” is a stronger indicator of actual behavior and commitment to nationalist
6The “Kyffhäuser-Bund” published a chronicle for the years between 1871 and 1905 (Kyffhäuser-
Bund der Deutschen Landes-Kriegerverbände 1908). However, this chronicle only includes regional
data and does not include disaggregated data at county level. The overall growth between 1871
and 1913 was immense. In 1875, the “Kriegervereine” had around 100.000 members. 40 years
later, it were 3 million members. However, due to the high aggregation level especially for Prussia
and many missing data points, I do not go into a further analysis of this data.
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views. For the analysis, I use the data for 1903 and 1913 because this allows me in combination
with the control variables to build a data set covering the growth of the “Kriegervereine” in the
decade before WWI.7 The census data is only available for 1900 and 1910. For a detailed anal-
ysis, it is necessary to match data on the “Kriegervereine” with official statistics. The data in
the reports from the “Kyffhäuser-Bund” is mainly at the level of official administrative districts.
Nevertheless, in some cases it is necessary to combine two or more districts, as the reports from
the “Kyffhäuser-Bund’” gave information only for two or more districts together. This is the rea-
son why every district separated into one rural and one urban district is combined. A detailed
list for each governmental district is provided in the Appendix in Table 7. The analysis at this
level is possible for 429 regional units. This number is comparable with other studies of this time
(Lehmann-Hasemeyer & Streb 2016, Cinnirella & Schueler 2017).
In order to give descriptive evidence on the location of the “Kriegervereine”, Map 1 shows
the share of membership relative to the male population older than 18 years in 1903. Overall,
there seems to be a higher density of the “Kriegervereine” in the central part of Prussia. Map 2
illustrates membership shares for 1913, we see higher membership shares for most regions. Map 3
shows the resulting development of the share of members in the “Kriegervereine” for the decade
before WWI. Especially, some regions in the East reveal a high increase in membership in the
“Kriegervereine” by more than 10 percentage points.








Figure 1: Share of members in the Kriegervereine, 1903
7I do not use the data for 1901 because it covers the regions in the East only at an aggregated
level. Thereby, I would lose many observations.
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Figure 2: Share of members in the Kriegervereine, 1913








Figure 3: Growth of share of members in the Kriegervereine, 1903-1913
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Industry Employment
Concerning employment in industry, I rely on the employment census from Kaiserliches Statistis-
ches Amt (1897). This census includes a detailed information for different sectors. For the purpose
of this article, I summarize all industrial sectors, e.g. chemistry and mining, and divide by total
employment in the district. Thereby, I have a measurement for industrialization. Map 4 shows the
industrial center in the Ruhr area, Silesia and Saxony. Especially the eastern part, many districts
have only a small share in industry employment.







Figure 4: Industry employment, 1895
4 Empirical analysis
OLS setting
As a first step of my analysis I aim to explain the difference in the share of membership in the
“Kriegervereine”,relative to the male population above 18 years, in the decade before World War I.
This variable captures the development of nationalism in Prussian districts.8 In order to investigate
drivers of the spread of nationalism, I use the following specification.
∆KVi,1913−1903 = α+ βIndi + γXi + θAD + ǫi (1)
8In comparison to growth rates, this calculation is the conservative one, because it does not
lead to potentially high growth rates in regions with a lower initial level.
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The independent variable is employment industry 1895 relative to total employment in 1895, Indi.
In addition, I include several controls, Xi, explained in Table 6, to control for population, religion,
language, military sites, and distance to border. Thereby, I can control for differences between
rural and urban areas and the ongoing social conflicts concerning minorities and religion as well as
for potential border effects. Moreover, I use fixed effects on the level of the “Regierungsbezirke”,
θAD. For all following OLS and IV specifications, I use cluster robust standard errors at the level
of administrative districts (AD, in German “Regierungsbezirke”).
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, all variables are standardized. The results in
Table 1 reveal support for a correlation between industry employment and the growth of the
“Kriegervereine”. Column 1 shows that an increase of industry employment by one standard
deviation corresponds to a 0.5 standard deviation slower change of the “Kriegervereine”. Including
several control variables in column 2 lead to slightly smaller coefficient for industry employment.
In addition, in regions with a higher population, lower share of German speaking people and
higher distance to the next border, there tend to be a smaller share of people engaged in the
“Kriegervereine”. Interestingly, the share of active military persons is negatively correlated with
membership in the “Kriegervereine”.
Table 1: Membership “Kriegervereine”, OLS
(1) (2)
∆ Membership KV, 1903-1913








Active Military Persons -0.120∗∗∗
(0.038)
Distance to border 0.371∗∗
(0.146)




∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors on the level of “Regierungs-
bezirke”
All variables are standardized.
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IV setting
However, industry employment might be endogenous. There might be issues of omitted variables,
reverse causation or both. For instance, there might be less industry employment due to strong
nationalist activities. To rule out these possibilities, I use coal potential as an instrumental variable
for industrial employment similar to the approach by Fernihough & O’Rourke (2014) who use
distance to the next carbon area as an instrumental variable for industrialization in Europe. Coal
is often found in strata from the late carboniferous age. Thus, coal potential is understood as
an exogenous indicator for coal availability.9 Therefore, it seems plausible to use this information
as an instrumental variable for industrialization. In difference to Fernihough & O’Rourke (2014),
coal potential captures the amount of carbon area. Similar to the concept of market potential
(Redding & Venables 2004, Kopsidis & Wolf 2012), I construct coal potential based on distance
and geological data alone. To measure the coal potential of a district, I calculate for every unit
of observation the area linked to the late carboniferous geological strata based on the 1:5 Million
International Geological Map of Europe and Adjacent Areas (IGME 5000) (Asch 2005). For my
calculation, I include the carboniferous strata in all parts at county level of Imperial Germany.
These considerations result in the following calculation:






Where i is the district of interest and j all districts, j = 1, ...n including i. Map 5 shows a high
coal potential for the regions around Breslau and the Ruhr area. The coal potential is lowest in the
northeastern parts of Prussia. A visual comparison with Figure 4 on industry employment confirms
the expected positive correlation between coal potential and industry employment. However, the
regions around Berlin, Kiel and other urban regions without access to coal also show high industry
employment and, therefore, might limit the power of the instrument.
9A close examination of the IGME 5000 map and a contemporary geological map from 1870
(von Dechen 1869) shows many similarities. However, the contemporary map does not allow to
compute the areas attached to different geological strata, but only to construct a dummy variable
for each district. Nevertheless, the map by von Dechen (1869) map shows that the knowledge














Figure 5: Coal Potential
For my empirical analysis, I use coal potential as instrumental variable in the following two-
stage estimation which aims to explain the effect of industry employment on the growth of the
“Kriegervereine” between 1903 and 1913.
Indi = α+ βCPi + γXi + θAD + ǫi (3)
∆KVi,1913−1903 = α+ β ˆIndi + γXi + θAD + ǫi
The results are shown in Table 2. In the first stage, we find a positive and statistically significant
effect of coal potential on industry employment. The second stage gives evidence for a causal
relationship between net migration and the growth of the “Kriegervereine”. The coefficient is
similar to the one in the OLS specification. An increase in industry employment by one standard
deviation corresponds to a decline in the share of membership in the “Kriegervereine” by 0.5
standard deviation.
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Table 2: Membership “Kriegervereine”, IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st stage 2nd stage reduced form OLS
Industry Employment ∆ Membership KV, 1903-1913
Coal Potential 0.213∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗
(0.077) (0.043)
Industry Employment -0.500∗∗∗ -0.446∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.089)
Population 0.833∗∗∗ -0.188∗ -0.604∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗
(0.102) (0.108) (0.080) (0.090)
Mother Tongue German 0.110 0.375∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.127) (0.107) (0.135)
Protestants 0.190∗∗∗ 0.031 -0.064 0.022
(0.067) (0.071) (0.081) (0.079)
Active Military Persons -0.017 -0.122∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
Distance to border -0.120 0.364∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.371∗∗
(0.150) (0.136) (0.170) (0.146)
Administrative Region FE X X X X
R2 0.6500 0.3493 0.4175
n 429 429 429 429
F-Statistic of weak instruments 27.257
Notes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors on the level of “Regierungsbezirke”
All variables are standardized.
As robustness check for the instrumental variable estimation, I weight the carbon area by
contemporary knowledge on the availability of coal deposits. The main reason for this is that
the information on the carbon area from the IGME 5000 does not reveal any information on
the quality of the coal. Therefore, I weight the carbon area with the estimates from Bärtling
(1926). These estimates on the coal deposits cover more than 90% of the carbon area from Asch
(2005).10 The results are shown in the Appendix in Table 9. This specification also supports my
argument. More precisely, the coefficient for the instrumented industry employment gets smaller,
but stays statistically significant. As a further robustness check, I control for the initial level of
membership in the “Kriegervereine” in 1903. This does not change the results as shown in the
Appendix in Table 10. In a third robustness check, I control whether the effects are driven by
changes in the denominator, male population above 18 years. To do so, I divide the members in
the “Kriegervereine” for both years by the male population above 18 years in 1903. The results in
the Appendix in Table ABC are similar to the standard IV specification in Table 2.
10This leads to the following calculation:






Given these results, it is important to discuss whether the requirements of the IV approach are
fulfilled (Angrist & Pischke 2015). The robust coefficient in the first stage gives evidence that the
instrument has a significant effect on the industry employment. The exclusion restriction would
be met, if the effect of coal potential only went through the channel of industry employment. Are
there any other reasons for which coal potential might matter for growth of the “Kriegervereine”,
except through industrialization? It is unlikely because coal potential especially matters for indus-
trialization and besides that has little other use. The independence assumption requires that the
instrument is randomly assigned and not correlated with omitted variables. As coal potential is
purely based on geological information, it is unlikely that this is driven by an omitted variable.
5 Mechanisms
So far, the results give strong evidence for a causal relationship between industry employment
and membership in the “Kriegervereine” in the decade before WWI. In this section, I aim to
explore explanations for reasons to join the “Kriegervereine” in less industrialized regions and not
to choose the “Kriegervereine” in industrialized regions. Thereby, I link the socio-economic changes
associated with industrialization with nationalism. As potential explanations, I will discuss the
political economy of the first globalization, migration and a divide between urban and rural regions.
Political Economy of the First Globalization
The well-known Heckscher-Ohlin narrative could be seen as one potential explanation for the
growth of the “Kriegervereine” and thereby provide an economic rationale for the spread of na-
tionalism. There is no doubt that the industrial sector was one of the winner’s during the first
globalization. The openness and competitiveness of this sector grew. Moreover, the grain inva-
sion effected the agricultural sector in countries like Germany (O’Rourke 1997). More specifically,
Lehmann (2010) shows that those regions with a high share of workers employed in industries with
a negative trade balance voted more likely in favor of protectionist parties in the 1870s. This was
particularly the case for regions with a high share of big agricultural enterprises. To control for this
reasoning, I include the share of the area covered by big agricultural enterprises. Thereby, I am
able to include those regions that lost especially in the first wave of globalization. Table 3 shows
the results: The coefficient for this variable is weakly statistically significant and negative. Thus, I
cannot find direct evidence for the explanation Lehmann (2010) offered for the 1870s. However, the
robust coefficient for industry employment in Table 3 can be understood as evidence that regions
that won due to the first globalization show a less nationalist reaction similar to the empirical ev-
idence for recent periods (Autor et al. 2016, Dippel et al. 2017). Given this quantitative evidence,
the positions from the “Kriegervereine” on economic issues further support these mixed results.
On the one hand, the “Kriegervereine” aimed to protect the people against the ongoing industrial-
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ization and favored a traditional life style and supported protectionist trade policies (Rohkrämer
1990, p.225). On the other hand, Rohkrämer (1990) highlights that the “Kriegervereine” faced
some difficulties in the support of these regions due to financial limitations and were at least am-
bivalent regarding the modern developments which the “Kriegervereine” favored as long as these
were of benefit for the nation.
Table 3: Political Economy of the First Globalization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st stage 2nd stage reduced form OLS
Industry Employment ∆ Membership KV, 1903-1913
Coal Potential 0.210∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗
(0.076) (0.046)
Industry Employment -0.541∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.086)
Big Agriculture -0.061 -0.145∗ -0.112 -0.138
(0.044) (0.083) (0.088) (0.082)
Controls X X X X
Administrative Region FE X X X X
R2 0.6512 0.3534 0.4238
n 429 429 429 429
F-Statistic of weak instruments 26.187
Notes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors on the level of “Regierungsbezirke”
All variables are standardized.
Migration
After providing evidence that the results are not driven by those regions that were most negatively
effected by the first globalization, I will argue that migration was a crucial connecting develop-
ment between industrialization and nationalism. The beginning 20th century was a time of mass
migration. It was not only a time of massive out-migration, especially to the USA as destination
country, but even more a time of internal migration, the biggest ever experienced in Germany
(Wehler 2006). The migration patterns were driven by the industrialization process (Grant 2005).
Moreover, the migration issue, especially in the eastern parts of Germany, were of particular interest
to nationalists in Germany. Due to a lack of success of a ”German India in Africa” or establishing
a big colonial empire in overseas territories, nationalists focused on a German colony in the East
(Conrad 2010). Supporters of these ideas described an outflow of German people in that regions
as danger for this imperial idea, especially because of the Polish minorities (Conrad 2010). Max
Weber was one famous supporter and judged this development as danger for the German nation
describing Polish people as animals (Weber 1993b, p.340) and the Eastern region as a German
colony (Weber 1993c, p.123). The solution for Max Weber and others was to call for a strong
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nationalist reaction and to foster social mobility of the German part of society within these regions
by supporting them to acquire agricultural property and fostering the social and patriotic ties
within these regions.11 Similarly, the “Kriegervereine” strongly opposed these migration patterns
and saw the Polish minority as a public enemy (Deutscher Kriegerbund 1903). In their newspaper
“Parole”, the Deutscher Kriegerbund (1904) described out-migration as a “lethal disease” for the
German nation. Instead of moving to the cities with the danger of moral decline, they were in
favor of living in the countryside, if possible with own private property (Deutscher Kriegerbund
1901). Regarding migration and the Polish minority, there seem to be striking similarities between
the “Kriegervereine” and Max Weber. Given this historical context, it is plausible to expect that
migration patterns driven by the industrialization process lead to a nationalist response in those
regions where people out-migrated because migration within Germany was seen as dangerous for
the German nation.
To account for this reasoning, I use net migration in my analysis. In order to have data on
migration, I extend the contemporary data by Max Broesike (1907) who calculated net migration
as difference between the actual population and the expected population when only considering
the birth and death rate for the time span 1900 and 1905 as percentage share relative to the
population. To extend my data set till 1910, I do this calculation for 1905 until 1910 based on
official publications given in Table 6. Net migration is positive if more people immigrate than
emigrate and negative if more people emigrate than immigrate. Map 6 shows that most of the
regions had a negative net migration and lost more then 10% of their population between 1900
and 1910, whereas the population in regions around the bigger cities (e.g. Berlin, Hamburg and
Kiel) and in the center of industry and mining (e.g. Ruhr and Wroclaw) rose due to positive net
migration.
11On the level of the nation state, the “Reichsansiedlungsgesetz” from 1886 was implemented to
improve the share of German people in the eastern regions - mainly in Poznan and West Prussia -
by buying land from Polish people. Overall, the success of the program was rather limited. After
1900, the Prussian settlement commission bought mainly land from German people (Eddie 2009).
In addition, the extent of the program was too small to change the majority in favor of the German
speaking population. Also the “Kriegervereine” had a very small and unsuccessful program for










Figure 6: Net Migration, 1900-1910
In order to avoid endogeneity issues by including industry employment and net migration in
one regression, I estimate the following three stage IV regression.12
Indi = α+ βCPi + γXi + θAD + ǫi
Migi = α+ β ˆIndi + γXi + θAD + ǫi (4)
∆KVi,1913−1903 = α+ βM̂igi + γXi + θAD + ǫi
In this regression, the first stage predicts the share of industry employment in a county by its
coal potential. In the second stage, the predicted industry employment is used to predict net
migration. In the third stage, the predicted net migration works as a predictor for the increase in
membership in the “Kriegervereine”. The results, reported in Table 4, support the previous results:
coal potential positively effects industry employment, the instrumented industry employment is a
positive predictor for net migration, and the net migration that is driven by the opportunities for
industry employment that is due to coal potential is negatively associated with membership in the
“Kriegervereine”.
12One other possibility would be to conduct a bounding analysis as done by Becker &Woessmann
(2009). However, this requires to assume a coefficient for the influence of industrialization on
nationalism based on a meta-analysis. This is not possible here, because such meta-analysis does
not exist.
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Notes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors on the level of “Regierungsbezirke”
All variables are standardized.
To explore the nationalist discourse on migration further, I especially analyze the minority
conflicts Weber mentioned in his inaugural lecture in Freiburg 1895. Weber argued that the
German nation is endangered by out-migration and a declining share of German speaking people
in the Eastern parts (Weber 1993a). Therefore, Weber called for a strong nationalist reaction from
civil society, academia and political elites. To test Weber’s call, I include a Weber dummy for those
regions that face a negative net migration, a declining share of German speaking people and have
at least 10% non-Germans in 1900. The econometric results are given in the Appendix in Table
12. By including this Weber dummy as well as the separate variables for net migration, change in
German speaking people and non-Germans, I find mixed evidence for Weber’s call. The dummy
variable itself is insignificant. However, the separate variables show strong effects. Next to the
strong effect of net migration, there seems to be a stronger nationalist reaction in regions with a
shrinking share of German speaking people.
As a further robustness check, I include a dummy variable for those regions, mainly West
Prussia and Poznan that belonged to Poland before the Polish partitions in 1772. It could be
plausible that parts of the underlying effect of migration is driven by the history of the partitions
and the fear that this history could be turned around again. Thereby, I can control for the reasoning
of the literature on the effects of activated history (Fouka & Voth 2016, Ochsner & Roesner 2017).
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The results in the Appendix in Table 13 indicate that there is only a negative and insignificant
effect. Thus, the effect of migration seems to be not driven by past borders and the fear of their
reocurrence, instead it is about the socio-economic developments in the the early 20th century.
Social Identities
As a third explanation, I argue that the result is driven by a divide between urban and rural
areas in terms of the availability and salience of other social identities. Shayo (2009) theoretically
showed that a spread of nationalist identities depends on the “perceived distance” to other social
identities, e.g. trade unions. If the distance to other social identities is high, the model predicts an
equilibrium with a higher share of nationalist identities. Applying this to Prussia, one has to bear
in mind that people employed in agriculture had no rights to form trade unions or to go on strike.
This was changed only after WWI (Bade 1980). Thus, the “perceived distance” to other social
identities is clearly higher in rural areas. Moreover, the historiography on Imperial Germany that
highlights social conflicts as driving force of nationalism, e.g. Eley (1991). Considering this, it
seems worthwhile to control for membership in trade unions. The regional spread in Map 7 shows
that trade unions were indeed stronger in the industrial centers of Prussia.






Figure 7: Labor unions, 1906
Obviously, membership in trade unions is endogenous here. Given the prohibition of trade
unions in agriculture, it seems plausible that industry employment is a good predictor for mem-
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bership in trade unions. Therefore, I again use a three stage IV model.
Indi = α+ βCPi + γXi + θAD + ǫi
Unionsi = α+ β ˆIndi + γXi + θAD + ǫi (5)
∆KVi,1913−1903 = α+ β ˆUnionsi + γXi + θAD + ǫi
The results in Table 5 reveal strong support for the explanation based on Shayo (2009). Coal
potential positively effects industry employment, the instrumented industry employment is a pos-
itive predictor for membership in trade unions, and membership in trade unions that is driven by
industry employment that is due to coal potential is negatively associated with membership in the
“Kriegervereine”. However, the effect is weakly statistically significant.
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∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors on the level of “Regierungsbezirke”
All variables are standardized.
6 Conclusion
Summarizing let me stress five main results. First, the “Kriegervereine” are a new and valid form
for measuring nationalism. Using data on the “Kriegervereine” I am able to capture everyday
nationalism before WWI. Second, an IV regression framework is employed to show strong evi-
dence for a causal relationship between the share of industrial employment and the growth of the
“Kriegervereine” in the decade before WWI. Thus, there is evidence that adverse economic change
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can lead to a spread of nationalism. Third, there is only weak support that the results are driven
by areas with big agricultural enterprises, the losers of the first globalization. Fourth, employing
a three stage IV model, I find support that the results are driven by migration patterns within
Prussia. Fifth, again using a three stage IV model, I find evidence for a divide between urban
and rural regions. More precisely, membership in trade unions has a strong negative effect on
membership in the “Kriegervereine”.
However, there are of course some limitations: Further research could analyze the effects of
the growing international trade in more detail by applying the approach by Autor et al. (2013).
This would require to combine trade statistics with census data. In addition, this study focused on
Germany in the decade before WWI. Therefore, it could be worthwhile to investigate the drivers
of nationalism before 1900 and also for other countries. Moreover, it would be interesting to
investigate the rise of the trade unions as new social identity.
Concluding, the findings suggest that the spread of nationalism can be explained with modern
industrial development and thus, nationalism has to be understood as a modern phenomena as
also highlighted in the historiography on nationalism, e.g. Anderson (1991). Moreover, unequal
and asymmetric industrial development seems to be one driver of mass militarization in the decade
before World War I.
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Table 6: Data Sources
Variable Description Source
Kriegervereine Members in one district Kyffhäuser-Bund der Deutschen
Landes-Kriegerverbände (1913,
1903)
Net Migration Net Migration as the difference between
the actual population and the popula-
tion based on the differences between
births and deaths
Broesike (1907), Kaiserliches
Statistisches Amt (1903, 1909,
1910a,b, 1915)




Population with German as mother
tongue
Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt
(1903, 1910b), Galloway (2007)
Protestants Protestants Galloway (2007)
Active Military
Persons
Active military persons Galloway (2007)





Employment in industrial sectors Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt
(1897)
Coal Potential See text Asch (2005)
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Table 8: Summary statistics
Variable Mean
sd in parantheses
∆ Membership KV, 1903-1913 6.396
in % relative to male population > 18 (4.023)
Industry Employment 32.40
in % relative to total employment (15.99)
Net Migration, 1900-1910 -5.45
in % relative to population in 1900 (8.611)
Membership in Trade Unions, 1906 2.22
in % relative to total employment (3.315)
Big Agriculture 17.24
in % relative to total area (16.30)
Population 80577.83
(131222.1)
Mother Tongue German 87.29
in % relative to population in 1900 (24.72)
Protestants 62.00
in % relative to population in 1900 (36.71)
Active Military Persons 0.75
in % relative to population in 1900 (1.309)
Coal Potential 0.27
(0.401)




Table 9: Membership “Kriegervereine”, IV robustness check I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st stage 2nd stage reduced form OLS
Industry Employment ∆ Membership KV, 1903-1913
Coal Potential w Deposits 0.163∗∗ -0.058
(0.069) (0.039)
Industry Employment -0.354∗∗∗ -0.446∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.089)
Population 0.865∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗ -0.624∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗
(0.105) (0.139) (0.086) (0.090)
Mother Tongue German 0.122 0.357∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.115) (0.107) (0.135)
Protestants 0.172∗∗ 0.007 -0.054 0.022
(0.069) (0.072) (0.084) (0.079)
Active Military Persons -0.025 -0.117∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
Distance to border -0.132 0.384∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.371∗∗
(0.157) (0.141) (0.172) (0.146)
Administrative Region FE X X X X
R2 0.6371 0.3446 0.4175
n 429 429 429 429
F-Statistic of weak instruments 12.637
Notes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors on the level of “Regierungsbezirke”
All variables are standardized.
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Table 10: Membership “Kriegervereine”, IV robustness check II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st stage 2nd stage reduced form OLS
Industry Employment ∆ Membership KV, 1903-1913
Coal Potential 0.224∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗
(0.079) (0.037)
Industry Employment -0.394∗∗∗ -0.458∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.093)
Membership in KV, 1903 -0.096 -0.213 -0.175 -0.216
(0.082) (0.130) (0.163) (0.139)
Population 0.786∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗ -0.691∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.162) (0.125) (0.117)
Mother Tongue German 0.146 0.443∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.129) (0.124) (0.150)
Protestants 0.210∗∗∗ 0.054 -0.028 0.065
(0.070) (0.079) (0.093) (0.091)
Active Military Persons -0.025 -0.139∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043)
Distance to border -0.122 0.372∗∗ 0.420∗∗ 0.363∗∗
(0.150) (0.147) (0.176) (0.155)
Administrative Region FE X X X X
R2 0.6532 0.36 0.4342
n 429 429 429 429
F-Statistic of weak instruments 29.604
Notes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors on the level of “Regierungsbezirke”
All variables are standardized.
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Table 11: Membership “Kriegervereine”, IV robustness check III
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st stage 2nd stage reduced form OLS
Industry Employment ∆ Membership KV, 1903-1913
Coal Potential 0.212∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗
(0.077) (0.045)
Industry Employment -0.466∗∗∗ 0.080
(0.113) (0.082)
Population 0.830∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.157) (0.079) (0.085)
Mother Tongue German 0.111 -0.331∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.060) (0.066) (0.076)
Protestants 0.192∗∗∗ -0.137∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
Active Military Persons -0.018 0.089∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Distance to border -0.121 -0.038 0.019 0.039
(0.150) (0.123) (0.096) (0.103)
Administrative Region FE X X X X
R2 0.6500 0.6836 0.6807
n 429 429 429 429
F-Statistic of weak instruments 26.718
Notes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors on the level of “Regierungsbezirke”
All variables are standardized.
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Administrative Region FE X
n 429
3rd stage





Change Mother Tongue German -0.083∗
(0.048)
Mother Tongue German 0.267∗∗
(0.128)
Controls X
Administrative Region FE X
n 429
Notes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors on the level of “Regierungsbezirke”
All variables are standardized.
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∆ Membership KV, 1903-1913






Change Mother Tongue German -0.082∗
(0.048)





∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors on the level of “Regierungsbezirke”
All variables are standardized.
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